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COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-
VIOLENCE V. REID: A SPECIOUS SOLUTION
TO THE "WORKS MADE FOR HIRE"
PROBLEM
The "works made for hire"' doctrine of copyright law 2 provides
that, in some circumstances, a hiring party rather than the creators
owns the copyright in a work of authorship. 4 The classification of
This note will use the expression "work for hire" interchangeably with the statutory
phrase "works made for hire."
2 The Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act") protects the right of an author to control the
reproduction of his or her intellectual creation. 17 U,S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988); A. LATMAN,
R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINE:TIES 12 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter
COPYRIGHT FOR THE NiNrriEs]. The 1976 Act derives substance from article I, section 8 of
the United States Constitution, which vests Congress with the power to grant authors rights
in their creations in order to encourage the production of literary, musical, graphic or other
artistic works. The United States Constitution vests Congress with the power "l_tlo promote
the Progress or Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Early decisions
construed the term "writings" broadly. E.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53, 58 (1884) ("By writings in that clause is meant the literary productions of those
authors, and Congress very properly has declared these to include all forms of writing,
printing, engraving, etching, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given
visible expression.") The subject matter of copyright under the 1976 Act is extremely broad
and not limited to contemporary methods of expression or reproduction. 17 U.S.C. 102(a)
(1988). Section 102(a) states that:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories: .
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying works;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
Id.
3 This note uses the term "creator"' to mean the one who actually creates the work. The
term "author" is avoided because under the 1976 Act "author" can mean either the actual
creator or, in special circumstances, an employer. See 17 U.S.C. 201(b) (1988).
4 Protection of a creator's work constitutes a basic foundation of copyright law. See W.
PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 114 (6th ed. 1986) (citing SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL PROVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGIIT
LAW: 1975 REVISION BILL, Ch. XI at 9 (draft ed. 1975)). The conviction that the production
and dissemination of creative works is a public benefit that can best be achieved through an
economic incentive for producing original works in the form of a limited monopoly, underlies
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a work as "work for hire" governs the dealings among artists, writ-
ers, other creators and businesses that use copyrighted works, such
as the publishing, music and motion picture industries. 5
 Such clas-
sification also determines several critical copyright ownership issues,
including initial ownership of the copyright, 6 copyright duration,'
renewal rights in the copyright,8
 and termination of copyright
this grant of copyright. E.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant ... copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors . . ."). Section 201 of the 1976 Act, which vests initial
ownership in the author of the work, embodies this principal. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), 106
(1988). The 1976 Act, however, carves out an exception to this principal in situations where
one. party creates a work at the behest of another party. 17 U,S.C. § 201(b) (1988). Section
201(b) of the 1976 Act provides that:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written in-
strument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Id. By defining an employer as an "author" in "work made for hire" situations, Congress
remained within its limits under the constitutional authorization to secure exclusive rights to
"Authors." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The "works made for hire" provision of the 1976 Act grants copyright ownership and
all accompanying rights to an employer when an employee creates a work in the scope of
his or her employment and, in special circumstances, to the hiring party when a freelance
creator produces commissioned works. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988); see also id. § 101. Section
101 defines a "work made for hire" as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text,
as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered
a work made for hire.
Id. § 101.
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2171 (1989). Appli-
cation of the "work for hire" doctrine significantly affects freelance creators and industries
that UK their works. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 213 SESS., STUDY No. 13, WORKS MADE
FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION 139 n.49 (Comm. Print 1960) (reported by B. Varmer), reprinted
in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 731 n.49 (Fisher Memorial ed. 1963) [hereinafter VARMER STUDY].
The study indicates that as of 1955 approximately 40% of all copyright registrations were
works for hire. Id. The Copyright Office does not maintain more recent statistics on the
number of works made for hire registrations. See Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2171 n.4. Industries.that
frequently utilize commissioned works include the publishing, motion picture, advertising
and music industries. Id. at 2171. Freelance creators may include artists, writers, photogra-
phers, designers, composers and computer programmers. Id,
6
 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (b) (1988).
Id. § 302(c).
I Id. § 304(a).
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rights. 9 Thus, predictability in the "work for hire" doctrine is critical
to the ability of parties to identify the potential and scope of eco-
nomic rewards for creative production and to structure contracts
concerning copyright interests accordingly. 1 °
9 See id. 203(a) (by negative implication). To gain protection under the 1976 Act, a
work must be original and it must be fixed in any medium. Id. § 102(a). Section 102 provides
that, Iclopyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed . . . ."
Id. The statute, however, protects only the expression through which an author conveys ideas
and not the ideas themselves. Id. § 102(b). Section 102(b) provides that, "[On no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id. Others may
utilize the information or ideas that inspired the expression, provided they do not copy the
expression itself. See id.
' 0 See Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2177-78, Copyright protection under the "work for hire"
doctrine differs from ordinary copyright protection in several important respects. For ex-
ample, ordinarily the creator of a work owns the copyright. 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), 106 (1988).
In contrast, the employer rather than the creator acquires the initial copyright in a "work
for hire." 17 U.S.C. § 201(6) (1988). See supra note 4 for text of provision. Initial ownership
is critical because the 1976 Act grants the copyright owner a bundle of five potentially
lucrative rights: the right to reproduce the work; the right to prepare derivative works from
the original creation; the right to distribute copies of the work to the public; the right to
perform the work publicly; and the right to publicly display the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
These rights arc subject to certain limitations under the 1976 Act such as fair uses of a
protected work and compulsory licensing authorization. Id. §§ 107, 115. Nonetheless, initial
ownership of copyright grants a valuable and broad property interest that can be exploited
in a variety of ways. The rights acquired under the 1976 Act are regulated by voluntary
agreements. COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES, supra note 2, at 32. Considerable flexibility exists
for the author to exploit his or her rights by subdividing them, e.g., licensing only the right
to reproduce while retaining the right to display the work in public, or by transferring or
licensing limited rights, e.g. limiting the duration. Id. at 33. Furthermore, the copyright
owner retains all copyright rights not expressly granted to another. Id.
The "work for hire" doctrine also affects the duration, renewal and termination of a
copyright interest. Normally, the duration of copyright protection extends for the life of the
author plus an additional 50 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988). This section applies to a work
created on or after January 1, 1978, the date on which the 1976 Act took effect. Id. 301.
Copyright protection for a "work for hire," however, lasts for 75 years from publication or
100 years from creation, whichever expires first. Id. § '302(c). Generally, an "author" is entitled
to renewal, which extends the copyright protection. Id. § 304(a), (b). An author must renew
the copyright of a work created before January 1, 1978, in order to extend the protection
to approximate the new duration dates set by the 1976 Act. Id. The 1976 Act, however,
defines an employer as "author" of a "work for hire." Id. § 201(b). See supra note 4 for the
text of the provision. Consequently, the employer, not the creator of a "work for hire," is
entitled to copyright renewal. See id. 304(a). Generally, when an author transfers any rights
in a copyrighted work to another party, the statute permits the author to terminate these
transfers after '35 years, thereby regaining copyright in the work and the accompanying right
to use the work. Id. 304(c). An author may terminate any grants or transfers of copyright
in a work, other than a work made for hire, produced prior to January 1, 1978. Id, These
voluntary reversionary rights protect authors who may have assigned these works before
realizing their true value. See H.R. Rep, No. 94-1476, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS. 124 (1976),
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Despite the essential need for predictability, definitional uncer-
tainty has complicated application of the "work for hire" doctrine,"
The 1976 Copyright Act ("1976 Act") does not define the terms
"employee" or "employment," two critically important concepts in
the determination of copyright ownership.' 2 This omission of a
statutory definition had resulted in inconsistent and sharply con-
trasting interpretations by federal courts, evidenced by four differ-
ent views of the appropriate definition of "employee" under copy-
right law. is
One test designated a creator as an employee when the hiring
party actually supervised and directed the creator's production of
the work." A similar, but broader formulation, designated a creator
as a copyright employee if the hiring party merely retained the
right to control the manner in which the product was created. 15 A
third test indicated that agency law should be applied to determine
if the creator is an employee under the "works made for hire"
provision of the 1976 Act. 16
 The fourth formulation suggested that
only a regular, salaried employee constituted a copyright employee
under the 1976 Act.i 7
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5740 [hereinafter H.R. REP, No.
94-1476] ("The provisions of section 203 are based on the premise that the . . . proposed
law should . [provide] a provision safeguarding authors against unremunerative transfers.
A provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors,
resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been
exploited."). If, however, the work constituted a "work for hire," the transferred copyright
is not subject to termination. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988).
I' See generally Fidlow, The "Wachs Made for Hire" Doctrine and the Employeelindependent
Contractor Dichotomy: The Need for Congressional Clarification, 10 HASTINGS COMM. AND ENT.
L.J. 591 (1988).
12 Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment—What Congress Really Intended, 35 J.
COPYRIGHT SOCY OF THE U.S.A. 210, 211 (1988).
13 Compare Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 553 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984) (court focused on the amount of supervision and control the
hiring party exercised over the creator) with Peregrine v. Lauren, 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D.
Colo. 1985) (court looked to hiring party's mere right to control and supervise creator's
production of the work) with Easter Seat Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334-35 (5th
Cir. 1987) (court applied agency law principles to determine status as "work for hire") with
Dumas v. Commerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989) (court concluded that only
regular, salaried employees fall within the "works made for hire" provision).
" Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 553; see also Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas
Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1987); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys.
Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
15 See Peregrine, 601 F. Supp. at 829; Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137,
142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
16 Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 334-35.
17 Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105.
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In June 1989, the United States Supreme Court, in Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, held that agency law shall be applied
in the determination of a creator's status as an "employee" under
the "work for hire" provision of the 1976 Act." In considering the
creator's status for copyright purposes, the Court concluded that
the language, structure and legislative history of the "work for hire"
provision warranted the application of agency law. 19 In applying
agency law, the Court determined that Reid, the creator, was an
independent contractor and therefore not an "employee" under the
1976 Act. 2°
This note focuses on the interpretation of the term "employee"
in light of the unique legislative history leading to the 1976 Act 2 '
Section I details the development of the "work for hire" doctrine
until 1966, including its application under both the 1909 Act and
under common law. 22 Section II examines the legislative history of
the "work for hire" provision in the 1976 Act. 23 Section III outlines
the conflicting tests that courts developed under the 1976 Act. 24
Section IV analyzes the law surrounding the "work for hire" doc-
trine and concludes that, contrary to the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Reid, Congress intended "employee" to refer to a formal,
salaried employee and not to the equivalent of "servant" under
agency law. 25 Furthermore, Congress's intentions provide a more
predictable framework within which freelance creators and com-
missioning parties can structure their business relationships.26 Fi-
nally, section IV concludes that Congress should amend the 1976
Act and add a definition of "employee" that limits that term under
the "works made for hire" provision of the 1976 Act to one who
receives a regular salary.
is 109 S. Ct. 2166,2168 (1989). In Reid, a freelance artist produced a sculpture for and
under the direction of a non-profit organization, Community for Creative Non-Violence
("CCNV"). Id. at 2169. The parties did not sign a written employment contract and they did
not discuss copyright ownership. Id. at 2169-70. Following completion of the sculpture, both
Reid, the artist, and CCNV filed copyright registrations. Id. at 2170.
19 See id. at 2178.
20 Id. at 2179-80.
21 See generally Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. Rev.
857 (1987).
22 See infra notes 27-48 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 49-145 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 146-231 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 232-65.
48 See infra notes 256-65 and accompanying text.
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1. HISTORY OF "WORKS MADE FOR HIRE"
Congress enacted the first Copyright Act in 1790 pursuant to
its Constitutional prerogative. 27
 Since that time, Congress has re-
vised the copyright law in general respects. 28
 The Copyright Act of
1909 ("1909 Act"), 29
 the most recent revision of copyright law prior
to the 1976 Act, was the first copyright statute to incorporate a
"work for hire" provision dealing specifically with works prepared
by an employee.8° Section 26, the "work for hire" provision of the
1909 Act, codified the common-law presumption that copyright
ownership in a work produced by a salaried employee vests with an
employer. 3 '
In the 1903 case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the
United States Supreme Court expressly recognized that, under com-
mon law, an employer owned the copyright in a work prepared by
his employee. 32 The Bleistein Court held that a lithograph company
owned the copyright in a circus advertisement created by the com-
pany's employee." In Bleistein, an employee of the Courier Litho-
graphing Co. ("Courier") who was employed on a regular, salaried
basis to produce lithographs for Courier, created three lithographs
intended as circus advertisements. Courier alleged that the defen-
dant infringed its copyright in the lithographs by copying the circus
posters in reduced form. Holding that Courier owned the copyright
in the circus advertisements, the Court reasoned that an employer
is entitled to copyright ownership in works produced by its regular
employees. 34
27
 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 10, at 47.
28
29
 Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 [hereinafter 1909 Act].
The 1909 Act was codified in Title 17 of the United States Code in 1947. Act of July 30,
1947, Pub. L. No. 281, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652 (repealed 1976) [hereinafter 1947 Codification].
3° See Fidlow, supra note 11, at 597-98. Section 62 of the 1909 Act provides that "the
word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire." 1909 Act, supra
note 29, § 62. Section 62 of' the 1909 Act became section 26 in the 1947 codification of the
1909 Act. 1947 Codification, supra note 29, § 26. This note uses section 26 when referring
to either § 62 of the 1909 Act or § 26 of the 1947 codification of the 1909 Act.
31 See, e.g., Fidlow, supra note 11, at 597.
32
 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903). Although ownership of the copyright by the employer was
not the central issue, the Court stated that, "(t]here was evidence warranting the inference
that the designs belonged to the plaintiffs, they having been produced by persons employed
and paid by the plaintiffs in their establishment to make those very things." Id. Later cases
indicate that Bleistein represents the origin of the "works made for hire" doctrine. See, e.g.,
Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1978).
52 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248.
34 Id.
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The 1909 Act, which codified this common-law presumption,
did not include a definition of "work for hire" or "employee."
Section 26 of the 1909 Act merely stated that in the case of "works
made for hire" an employer shall constitute the "author."" Thus,
the distinction between an employee and an independent artist
became subject to judicial interpretation. 36
Early decisions under the 1909 Act applied the statutory "work
for hire" doctrine only to regular employment situations," drawing
a clear distinction between traditional, salaried employees and in-
dependent artists. 38 Over time, principles developed at common law
concerning copyright ownership of commissioned works which re-
tained the distinction between an independent creator and a sala-
ried employee." The courts refined this distinction in early cases
involving portraits and photographs.° These cases developed a
rebuttable presumption that the employer and commissioned party
intended to have the copyright assigned to the hiring party unless a
contract existed to the contrary. 4 '
The 1939 case of Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co. applied this
common-law principle of implied assignment to other commis-
sioned art work.42 In Yardley, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit determined that an artist, commissioned to
paint a mural, did not own the copyright in the art work.° The
dispute in Yardley arose when the City of New York, through a
33 1947 Codification, supra note 29, § 26. A full definitional clause was requested to
clarify this distinction, but none was ever added. See Misc. Amends. to S. 6330 and H.R.
19853 Proposed to the Copyright Office, reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE litsuntv OF THE 1909
COPYRIGHT ACT at M55 (1976).
36 Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325 (1987).
' 7 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2177 (1989); see also
VARMER STUDY, supra note 5, at 130 ("[AJI1 the cases [decided under the 1909 Act] have
involved salaried employees who received either a fixed salary or a minimum salary plus
commission . . . . Hence, it may be concluded that section 26 [of the 1909 Act] refers only
to works made by salaried employees in the regular course of their employment.").
39 Compare, e.g., In re Journal-News Corp., 104 F. Supp, 843, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (holding
that newspaper owned the copyright in a column written by its regular, salaried employee)
with Altman v. New Haven Union Co., 254 F. 113, 118 (D.C. Conn, 1918) (stating general
rule "[w]here the photographer takes the portrait for the sitter under employment by the
latter, it is the implied agreement that the property in the portrait is in the sitter).
39 See Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 325-27.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 325. In Easter Seal, the court stated; "These early cases presumed that the
copyrights were assigned to the patron under the commission contract; there was nothing in
them about "work for hire." (emphasis in original). Id.
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general contractor, hired Charles Turner to paint a mural." The
employment contract was silent on the issue of copyright. Mr.
Turner completed the mural and received payment. Upon Mr.
Turner's death, his sister, Mrs. Yardley, obtained statutory rights in
Mr. Turner's purported original copyright.'" Mrs. Yardley sued
Houghton Mifflin for copyright infringement based on its repro-
duction of her brother's paintings in history books." The court
affirmed the lower court judgment for Houghton Mifflin because
Mrs. Yardley did not own the copyright. 47
The Yardley court reasoned that the copyright had impliedly
passed from Mr. Turner to his employer, the City, because no
agreement to the contrary existed between the parties. Thus, the
court concluded that Houghton Mifflin's reproduction of the paint-
ings was valid because the City, which was the legal copyright owner,
had granted Houghton Mifflin permission to do so. Analogizing to
the earlier portrait and photography cases, the Yardley court an-
nounced a general rule that copyright ownership of a commissioned
work was presumed to be assigned to the hiring party unless an
agreement to the contrary between the parties existed."
Thus, under early copyright law, employers generally were
considered copyright owners of "works made for hire" and of com-
missioned works. Courts used two different and distinct analyses,
however, to reach this conclusion. Courts applied the statutory
"works made for hire" provision of the 1909 Act, which vested
copyright ownership in the employer, to regular employment situ-
ations. Courts applied common law, which presumed that freelance
creators intended to assign their works to the commissioning party,
to commissioned works. Thus, early copyright law maintained a
clear distinction between traditional, salaried employees and inde-
pendent creators.
H. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
Between 1924 and 1940, Congress introduced several copyright
law revision bills but failed to enact them." In the 1950s, however,
44
 Id. at 29.
45 Id. at 30.
45 Id.
47 Id. at 31.
45 Id.
45 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 10, at 47; HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
87TH CONG., 1ST SF.SS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW at x (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted
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Congress took steps to revise copyright law substantially in order to
align copyright with advances in technology. 50 During the revision
process, ownership of "works made for hire" became the subject of
much heated debate, negotiation and finally, compromise.." This
revision involved a unique legislative process. 52
Dialogue among special interest groups played a central role
in the legislative process. This dialogue, however, differed substan-
tially from the bargaining incidental to lobbying that generally ac-
companies enactment of a statute. 53 For example, Congress officially
funded these negotiations and, in conjunction with the Copyright
Office, provided supervision. 54 Moreover, the bargaining sessions
in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman, ed. 1976)
[hereinafter REGISTER'S REPORT]; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONC., 1ST SESS., STUDY No. 1, THE
HISTORY OF U.S.A. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION FROM 1901 To 1954 4 (Comm. Print 1960)
(reported by Goldman), reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1103 (Fisher Memorial Ed.
1963) [hereinafter S•ruov No. H. Most of the suggested revisions were aimed at bringing
United States copyright law into conformity with the Berne Convention, an international
Copyright Union established in 1886 to recognize reciprocal copyright protection for mem-
bers. STUDY No.1 . supra, at 4.
5° See H.R. REP No. 94-1476, supra note 10, at 47.
'" See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166,2174 (1989) ("The
Act, which almost completely revised existing copyright law, was the product of two decades
of negotiation by representatives of creators and copyright-using industries, supervised by
the Copyright Office and . . . by Congress."); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 10, at 121
("The work-made-for-hire provisions of this bill represent a carefully balanced compromise
62 See Litman, supra note 21, at 862. Litman explains the unique legislative process as
follows:
Thiel legislative history reflects an anomalous legislative process designed to
force special interest groups to negotiate with one another .... The legislative
materials disclose a process of continuing negotiations among various industry
representatives, designed and supervised by Congress and the Copyright Office
and aimed at forging a modern copyright statute from a negotiated consensus.
During more than twenty years of negotiations, the substantive content of the
statute emerged as a series of interrelated and dependent compromises among
industries with differing interests in copyright.
td.
69 Litman, supra note 21, at 871 n.83, (citing 122 CONG. REC. 31,985 (1976) (remarks of
Rep. Drinan) ("the compromises in this bill do not represent the kind frequently associated
with the legislative process")). See generally STAFF OF THE. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965
REVISION BILL. (COMM. Print 1965), reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT].
69 H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 10, at 47.
In that year i19551, the movement for general revision of the U.S. copyright
law was revived and the legislative appropriations act for the next 3 years
provided funds for a comprehensive program of research and studies by the
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became part of the official government record. 55
 One commentator
notes that, although negotiation and bargaining often accompany
the enactment of a statute, it is unusual for Congress to fund and
supervise such negotiations. 56
 It is even more uncommon for Con-
gress to produce an official record of the bargaining sessions.57
Nonetheless, Congress delegated the chore of framing the sub-
stance, structure and language of the "works made for hire" pro-
vision to industry representatives. 58
 Congress resisted traditional
lobbying and insisted that interested industries reach a consensus. 59
Thus, some commentators conclude that the legislative history of
the "works made for hire" provision of the 1976 Act is unique
because of the officially sponsored character of the pre-legislative
negotiations that resulted in a compromise. 8°
Furthermore, once the special interest groups reached a com-
promise, Congress enacted the compromise with little further de-
bate or revision. 6 ' In addition, although various special interest
groups subsequently proposed variations in the "work for hire"
provision, 62
 once the compromise was incorporated into a bill intro-
duced in Congress in 1965, Congress deferred to the Register of
Copyrights' advice and maintained the compromise almost precisely
intact." As a result, the 1976 Act's legislative history reveals little
Copyright Office as the groundwork for such revision. There followed a period
of study which produced 35 published monographs on most of the major
substantive issues in copyright revision, and culminated in 1961 in the "Report
of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright
Law.
Id.; see also Community for Creative Non-Violence v Reid, 109 S. Ct 2165,2174 (1989) ("The
Act . . . was the product of . . . negotiation by representatives of creators and copyright-
using industries, supervised by the Copyright Office and . . Congress.").
55 Litman, supra note 21, at 871 n.83.
56 Id.
57 Id.
55 See id. at 880. Litman notes that "[m]embers of Congress openly acknowledged their
limited substantive expertise and their largely supervisory role in the drafting process. They
emphasized that they had delegated to industry representatives the task of forging the
statute's substantive provisions and they praised the negotiating process that evolved." Id.
59 Id. at 871.
6° See, e.g., id. at 871 n.83.
el Id. at 868.
62
 See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4397, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R.
6835 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
of the Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 264-71 (1965), reprinted in 6 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT
REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman ed.) [hereinafter 1965 Howe Hearings]
(testimony of Leonard Zissu, Composers & Lyricists Guild, proposing to replace the "works
made for hire" provision with a shop right provision.).
BS E.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
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evidence of Congress's specific intent on substantive copyright is-
sues."
Throughout the negotiation process, representatives of au-
thors, screenwriters and composers advocated freedom from the
encroachment on independent creators' rights, whereas represen-
tatives of publishers and the motion picture industry generally op-
posed changes in the existing law. 65 The resulting structure and
language of the "work for hire" provision of the 1976 Act reflects
a carefully worked out compromise by the affected interest groups
which Congress subsequently endorsed. 66 Commentators suggest
that, because congressionally sanctioned special interest groups de-
veloped the structure and language of the 1976 "works made for
hire" provision, and because of the paucity of congressional input,
courts must consider the special interest groups' understanding of
their agreement in order to give the compromise its congressionally
intended effect. 67
The lengthy congressional record that culminated in the "work
for hire" compromise provision can be divided into five subsections.
The first subsection, Works Made for Hire and on Commission, the 1958
report known as the Varmer Study, is one of a series of studies
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW: 1975 REVISION BILL 306-
07 [hereinafter REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT] (opposing alteration of "care-
fully negotiated definition" of works made for hire); see also Litman, supra note 21, at 868.
" See Litman, supra note 21, at 868.
65 O'Meara, "Works Made for Hire" Under the Copyright Ad of 1976—Two Interpretations, 15
CamonTost L. REV. 523, 526 (1982). This encroachment had resulted under the common-
law presumption of implied copyright assignment. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the early common-law presumption of implied copyright assignment.
66 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 10, at 121; SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note
53, at 66. The Copyright Office described the 1965 bill (H.R. 4'347), which was enacted in
the 1976 revision with only insignificant changes, as "a carefully worked out compromise
aimed at balancing legitimate interests on both sides." SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note
53, at 66.
67 See Litman, supra note 21, at 894. Litman states that:
Congress, for its part, chose to balance those interests by seeking and then
enacting a network of' negotiated compromises. If courts were to interpret the
statute by determining whether they could give those compromises effect, they
would necessarily need to consider what the parties to the compromises believed
their agreements meant.
Id. Litman also notes that:
Congress's approach to enacting a modern copyright statute reflects an excep-
tional willingness to adopt particular language because industry representatives
had agreed on it. lithe reasons industry representatives agreed on that language
and their interpretations of what the language meant can illuminate the statu-
tory language, then considering their story will yield a useful interpretive tool.
Id. at 881; see also Hardy, supra note 12, at 241.
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commissioned by Congress to examine substantive copyright is-
sues. 68
 The second subsection consists of the 1961 Report of the
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law
("Register's Report") 69
 and subsequent meetings convened by the
Copyright Office for interest groups." The third subsection is the
1962 Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law ("Preliminary
Draft")7 ' and subsequent negotiations among special interest
groups.72
 The fourth subsection consists of three identical revised
bills introduced in Congress in 1964 (collectively the "1964 Bill")
and the record of the subsequent bargaining by interested parties. 73
The last subsection consists of four identical bills drafted in 1965
(collectively the "1965 Bill") 74
 and eventually enacted, almost ver-
batim, as section 101 of the 1976 Act, 75 as well as the Supplementary
Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill ("Supplementary Report"), 76 which
accompanied and explained in detail the 1965 bill.
As a foundation for a general revision of the 1909 Act, Con-
gress ordered a series of thirty-five studies in 1955 to examine major
copyright issues." One of these studies, the Varmer Study, examined
66
 VARMER &rum, supra note 5.
69 REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 49.
79 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88'1'11 CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT REVI-
SION, PART 2: DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON
THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1963), reprinted in 3
OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman, ed. 1976) [here-
inafter REPORT DISCUSSION].
71 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88T11 CONG., 1ST SF_SS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED H.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS
AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT (Comm. Print 1964), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT
REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
72 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1964), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION
LEGISLATIVE His RY [hereinafter FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON DRAFT].
" S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 16260 (1964); H.R. 11947, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC. 16256 (1964); I-1.R. 12354, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REC.
19269 (1964). This note cites to the three bills collectively as reproduced in the STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 5:
1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS (Comm. Print 1965), reprinted in 4
OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY [hereinafter 1964 REvisior., BILL].
7' Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680,
H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 5 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT
REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (George S. Grossman, ed.) [hereinafter 1965 BILL].
75 See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2175-76 (1989).
7li SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra 1101.e 53.
77 H.R. REP 94-1476, supra note 10, at 47; STUDY No. 1, supra note 49, at ix.
These studies, covering practically all aspects of American copyright law, narrate
the history and describe the provisions of the present United States Copyright
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judicial treatment of employees and independent creators under
the "work for hire" provision of the 1909 Act and constitutes the
first section of the record. 78 The study concluded that courts had
treated employees and independent creators separately under copy-
right law. 79 Courts had adjudicated works produced by employees
under the statutory "work for hire" provision, whereas they had
decided issues involving commissioned works under the common
law. 8° Furthermore, although recognizing the inherent ambiguity
in the concept of "employee," the Varmer Study noted that case law
had consistently interpreted employment under the "work for hire"
provision as referring only to regular, salaried employment.'"
After circulating the Varmer Study among interest groups af-
fected by copyright revision, the Register of Copyrights prepared a
report of tentative recommendations intended to generate discus-
sion.82 The Register's Report, which constitutes the second section
of the record, proposed that "works made for hire" specifically
exclude commissioned works." Consistent with the conclusions of
the Varmer Study, this change simply clarified the distinction between
salaried employees and independent creators that existed under the
1909 Act."
Law, as enacted in 1909 and as amended to date, describe the comparable
provisions of foreign laws and international conventions, analyze the numerous
issues, and suggest various possible alternative solutions. These studies provided
the groundwork for the Copyright Office revision report, which ... contains
the tentative recommendations of the Copyright Office for revision of the Law.
Id.
78 VARMER STUDY, supra note 5, at 128-30.
78 Id. at 142.
" Id. at 127-28.
81 Id. at 130. The Varmer Study stated that, lain the cases (that had dealt with employ-
ment] have involved salaried employees who received either a fixed salary or a minimum
salary plus commission . . . Hence, it may be concluded that section 26 [of the 1909 Act]
refers only to works made by salaried employees in the regular course of their employment."
Id.
REGISTERS REPORT, supra note 49, at iii.
83 See id. at 86-87 (proposing that definition of "works made for hire" should include
"works created by an employee within the regular scope of his employment," but not includ-
ing a work made on special order or commission).
84 See id. at 86 ("The courts, however, have not generally regarded commissioned works
as 'made for hire.'"); REPORT DISCUSSION, supra note 70, at 144. Barbara Ringer, a represen-
tative from the Copyright Office, described the proposed definition in the following manner:
"First, with respect to works made for hire, 1 think the report in essence recommends that
the present law be retained ... , The report recommends a somewhat more specific definition
of what is a 'work made for hire,' but other than that would leave the present law undis-
turbed." REPORT DISCUSSION, supra note 70, at 144. Participants in the discussion did not
object strongly to the explicit exclusion of commissioned works from the "work for hire"
doctrine at this phase. Hardy, supra note 12, at 227. This may be attributable to the existence
of the strong common-law presumption of employer ownership of copyright in commissioned
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The Register's Report spawned heated debate among repre-
sentatives of industries and groups affected by copyright law. 85
 The
Register of Copyrights convened four meetings of a Panel of Con-
sultants, consisting of representatives of affected industry groups,
for the purpose of discussing the Register's Reports&
Objections from members present at the meetings, and written
comments submitted by interested parties, reflected an understand-
ing among the negotiating parties that the term "employee" in the
Register's Report meant a regular, salaried employee. 87
 Motion pic-
ture representatives, for example, objected to the recommendation
that employers not be considered "authors" under "work for hire." 88
This group also objected to the use of the term "regular" in "regular
scope of employment" because it believed that "regular" might limit
the circumstances in which copyright vests with an employer."
When voicing their concerns, negotiating parties did not debate the
definition of "employee" under the proposed act; they understood
and accepted that "employee" meant a regular, salaried employee. 90
Universal Pictures' representative, Joseph A. Dubin, framed his
objection to the proposal to deny employers status as "authors" in
terms that distinguished between employers who maintain regular,
salaried employees and employers who maintain less formal em-
ployment relationships. 9 ' When confronted with the argument that
classifying employers as "author" would completely deprive em-
works based on an implied assignment. Id. Under the proposal in the Register's Report,
federal statutory copyright protection would attach whenever a work was "publicly dissemi-
nated by the publication of copies, registration in the Copyright Office, public performance,
or the public distribution of sound recordings." REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 49, at 43.
Thus, before a work became available to the public, common-law protection would apply.
Hardy, supra note 12, at 227-28.
85 See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 53, at ix—x.
88 Id. at x. Additionally, the Register of Copyrights received and reviewed written
comments and recommendations from interested parties. Id.
87 See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 12, at 241; Litman, supra note 21, at 901.
as See REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 49, at 87. This Register's Report states that, lilt
has been suggested that the statute, instead of indicating that the employer is the author,
should merely provide that the right to secure copyright vests in the employer. We would
adopt this suggestion." Id. Members raised concerns that copyright protection in foreign
countries, which grant protection only to "authors," might be jeopardized or difficult to
establish. See Hardy, supra note 12, at 225 n.66.
88 See REPORT DISCUSSION, ROM note 70, at 159. The group raised fears that "regular
scope" might be too narrow such that works produced by employees that are not within their
"regular" duties may fall outside the "work for hire" doctrine. Id.
90 See Hardy, supra note 12, at 222-23.
9' See REPORT DISCUSSION, supra note 70, at 155. Dubin stated that, 10) one to this
date has suggested, outside of the Copyright Office report, that an employer who meets a
weekly payroll should not be entitled, in the absence of a contract, to be the author." Id.
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ployees of authorship status, Dubin again distinguished between
formal employees and independent contractors. Dubin responded
that existing law, which treated employers as authors, did not de-
prive freelance creators of copyright protection because author sta-
tus only vested in employers with regular, salaried employees. 12
Comments by John Schulman, chairman of the American Pat-
ent Law Association's Committee on Copyright," also reflected the
assumption that the term employment referred only to regular,
salaried employment.`19 Schulman implicitly distinguished between
an employee and an independent contractor when he argued that
regular, salaried employees should also be allowed to obtain copy-
right in their creative efforts."
After considering the views expressed in the discussions and
comments on the Register's Report, the Copyright Office prepared
a Preliminary Draft for a new copyright statute as a basis for further
debate." This third section of the record, the Preliminary Draft,
was issued in 1963 and granted "author" status to employers.° It
also included a provision that vested copyright ownership' in the
employer, but which allowed the parties to agree contractually to
transfer rights back to the employee. 98 The Preliminary Draft also
added the Register's Report definition of "work for hire," which
expressly excluded commissioned works." The Copyright Office
convened eight meetings with an enlarged Panel of Consultants,
consisting of almost anyone with a significant interest in the sub-
92 See REPORT DISCUSSION, supra note 70, at 155. Dubin noted that classifying employers
as authors "take(s] nothing away front the author, for the very simple reason that he can
write on speculation, he can come in and give you his finished product, instead or sitting
down week by week and drawing weekly compensation and not facing any risks at all." Id.
95 The American Patent Law Association's Committee on Copyright is now known as
the American Intellectual Property Law Association. Hardy, supra note 12, at 227 n.69.
94 See id. at 227.
g' See REPORT DISCUSSION, supra note 70, at 153-54. Schulman commented that, lilt
should be possible for me to make a contract and say, 'even though I am employed, and you
pay me X dollars a week, nevertheless I want to own title to the copyright. and I give you
only an exclusive right to use the motion picture.'" Id.
PRELIMINARY DRAM', SUpra note 71, at v.
97 Id. at 15.
95 See id. at 15-16.
" See id. Section 14 of the Preliminary Draft provided that, li]rt the case of a work
made for hire, the employer shall, for purposes of this title, be considered the author and
shall have all of the rights comprised in the copyright unless the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise," Id. A footnote to this statement stated that, "fa] 'work made for hire' would be
defined elsewhere as a work prepared by an employee within the scope of the duties of his
employment, but not including a work made on special order or commission," Id. at 15 n.1 I.
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ject.'" Panel members and other interested parties raised vigorous
objections concerning the Preliminary Draft, largely based on the
preemptive effect the proposed act would have on state common
law.'°'
The Preliminary Draft envisioned a uniform federal system of
copyright that would preempt state common law.'" It also proposed
that federal copyright protection should attach when a creator fixes
a work in a tangible medium rather than at the time of publica-
tion.'" The proposed act would therefore completely override the
common-law presumption of implied assignment.'" Moreover, it
would explicitly deny statutory "work for hire" status to any com-
missioned work.'" The Preliminary Draft, therefore, effectively
denied employers initial ownership in any commissioned works.
Additionally, the Preliminary Draft recommended the implemen-
tation of a right of reversion to enable a creator to reclaim any
transfers, grants or assignments of copyright after a period of
time.'" Thus, the Preliminary Draft also limited the time period
during which an assignee or licensee could exploit the work because
a creator could regain his or her copyright. 107
The negotiating participants believed that the term "employee"
in the Preliminary Draft applied only to salaried employees.'" For
example, John R. Peterson, representing the American Bar Asso-
ciation, clearly understood that the Preliminary Draft distinguished
between employees and freelance creators because he objected to
such a distinction as inappropriate.'°° Similarly, Saul N. Rittenberg
of Metro-Goldwyn Mayer stated that he did not approve of the
Preliminary Draft's distinction between formal employees and free-
lancers."° Written comments submitted by Joseph A. Adelman also
G°
 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 53, at xi.
Hardy, supra note 12, at 231-32.
102 See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 71, at 18.
105 See id. at 18-19.
1" See id. at 15 n.11,18.
1°5 See id.
1°4 See id. at 15-16.
07
 See id.
1" Hardy, supra note 12, at 232.
'" See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 71, at 260. Peterson stated, "I don't think there
is any valid philosophical or economic difference between the situation in which you have a
man on a continuing basis of orders which justifies placing him on your payroll, and the
situation in which you give him a particular order for a particular job." Id.
10 See id. at 272. Rittenburg stated, "lilt seems to me that the present draft has given
more emphasis to formalism than necessary. If I commission a work from a man, ... and
pay for it, what difference does it make whether I put him under an employment contract
or establish an independent contractor relationship?" Id.
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criticized the different treatment that the Preliminary Draft af-
forded to independent creators)"
Comments made by Horace S. Manges, representing the Joint
Committee of the American Book Publishers Council and the Amer-
ican Textbook Publishers Institute {"ATPI"), expressed his concern
that the exclusion of commissioned works would require members
of the publishing industry to add people to the payroll in order to
retain copyright ownership."' Bella L. Linden, also representing
the ATPI, was concerned about the exclusion of commissioned
works from the "work for hire" provision because she thought that
such a revision would require publishers of encyclopedias and com-
pilations to put everyone on the payroll in order to maintain full
copyright ownership of the work." 3
 The ATPI reiterated this con-
cern in a written statement that recognized a difference between
regular employees and independent contractors but, nonetheless,
criticized the distinction." 4 Other comments criticized the different
protection afforded to independent creators under the Preliminary
Draft." 3
At one point during the discussions, a lawyer representing the
American Bar Association, Samuel W. Tannenbaum, suggested that
the "work for hire" provision be modified by replacing the term
"employer" with the term "master," thus incorporating the agency
"' See id. at 321. Adelman noted, lilt might be helpful not to restrict the description
of a 'work made for hire' to the technical employer employee relationship. For various
reasons today, a person may be engaged as an independent contractor, yet the hiring party
has all of the incidents (and therefore should have the rights) of an employer." Id.
112 See id. at 259. Manges remarked, "[plublishers would be discouraged completely
f 'min using any freelancer. There would he a necessity of putting people on the payroll
whom the employers wouldn't want to put on the payroll, and where the employees would
prefer to work as independent contractors." Id.
11 ' See id, at 297. Linden commented, "no encyclopedia company or reference book
publisher can possibly employ experts in every field of scientific and literary endeavor in
order to produce the composite works which they market and sell." Id.
' 14 See id. at 391. The ATPI's written statement noted, "it is neither practical nor possible
(if top specialists in a variety of areas are required) to hire these specialists as employees on
a full-time basis." Id.
15 E.g., id. at 2G7. For example, F. Gabriel Perle, of Time, Inc., stated:
[T]he whole term of "employee for hire" has thrown our comptrollers and
accountants throughout the whole publishing industry into a tizzy. Where you
get an outside entity and you ask them to create a work for hire, and it's the
express intention of all the parties that that work product be the exclusive
product of the commissioner or the orderer, their comptrollers and accountants
start going into a real tailspin the minute they start seeing the word "employee,"
because this means social security, withholding, and all the other attendant
mechanical housekeeping tasks.
Id,
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law concept of "master-servant."" 6 This change would have ex-
panded the class of creators subject to the "work for hire" doctrine
beyond formal, salaried employees because the degree of control
and supervision a "master" exerts over his or her "servant" is a
factor relevant to the determination of his or her "servant" status.'''
The parties did not pursue this modification in debate and the
Register of Copyrights rejected the idea." 8
Following the debate on the Preliminary Draft, the Copyright
Office reviewed the discussions and comments of the special interest
groups and revised the Preliminary Draft." 6 This fourth section of
the record, the 1964 Revision Bil1, 12° proposed a "work made for
hire" definition dramatically different from the Preliminary
Draft.'" Instead of excluding commissioned works from the defi-
nition of "works made for hire," the 1964 Revision Bill proposed
that "works made for hire" include special commissioned works if
both parties expressly agree in writing that the work shall constitute
a "work for hire. "122
116 Id. at 273. Tannenbaum suggested:
It would seem to me that much of the difficulty to formulate a definition might
be avoided if we used the words "master and servant," which have been rec-
ognized by a long line of cases. I would suggest rephrasing it as follows: "In
the case of a work made by one whose relationship is deemed to be a servant
during the existence of a 'master-servant relationship,' ....
Id.
See id. at 274. Mr. Tannenbaum explained the "master-servant" relationship as one
in which the servant "receives compensation and is subject to control and regulation by the
person for whom he performs the work." Id.
" 8 See id. The Register of Copyrights, Abraham Kaminstein, noted that "'master and
servant' sounds medieval." Id. Mr. Kaminstein rejected the suggestion to employ an agency
law definition:
Then you have a[n agency law] definition here which would open the door to
persons who could not be deemed to be the author to come in and claim so-
called "authorship" under a presumption which 1 think is unnatural: that the
man who paid the money to the man who did the writing thereby became the
author of the work.
Id.
"9 See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 53, at xi—xii.
120 Id. at xii.
121 See Hardy, supra note 12, at 236.
122 See 1964 REVISION BILL, supra note 73, at 31. Section 54 of the Bill states, "[a] 'work
made for hire' is a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment, or a
work prepared on special order or commission if the parties expressly agree in writing that
it shall be considered a work made for hire." Id. In addition, the bill extended the time
period after which an author could terminate a copyright from 25 to 35 years. Id. at 10. This
change was made pursuant to objections from various industry representatives who com-
plained that 25 years was insufficient to exploit particular works. See, e.g., PRELIMINARY Dann.,
supra note 71, at 283 (music industry representatives protested because few songs become
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The 1964 Bill was introduced in both Houses of Congress for
the purpose of stimulating discussion as a basis for the preparation
of a revision bill to be introduced in the 89th Congress.' 23 The
Copyright Office convened a two-day meeting of a Panel of Con-
sultants to review the 1964 Bill.'" Representatives of authors vig-
orously objected to the statutory authorization of "work for hire"
agreements.' 25 Authors' agents feared that commissioning parties
would use their superior bargaining power to force independent
creators to sign "work for hire" contracts.' 26 Such "work for hire"
contracts would effectively nullify the reversion provision that pro-
vided authors the right to terminate copyright transfers. 127
At this point, negotiations appeared to be at an impasse.' 28
Writers and composers supported the retention of a reversion pro-
vision and the preservation of initial copyright ownership in free-
lance creators.' 2" Representatives of the publishing and movie in-
dustries did not wish to restrict the commissioned works clause of
the "work for hire" provision.' 30
In 1965, the competing interests reached an historic
compromise"' which was set out in a joint memorandum submitted
to Congress and the Copyright Office, incorporated into the 1965
Bill, and ultimately enacted in the same form and nearly the same
terms eleven years later as section 101 of the 1976 Act."' In ex-
change for retaining the extended reversion provision and prohib-
iting the creation of "works made for hire" by contract, the authors'
great hits and exploitation of the few successful sellers was necessary to recoup losses on the
majority).
123 See 1964 REVISION BILI„ supra note 73, at v.
124 See id. The Copyright Office also accepted written comments concerning the 1964
Bill. See id.
' 25 See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 53, at 67; Ossola, Work for Hire: A Judicial
Quagmire and a Legislative Solution, 17 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 23,33 (Fall 1987). -
120 See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 53, at 67; Ossola, supra note 125, at 33.
127 See Hardy, supra note 12, at 237.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 237-38.
"0
 Id. at 237.
131 Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciaiy, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1965) (Memo-
randum of American Book Publishers Council, Inc., American Guild of Authors & Com-
posers, American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, American Textbook Pub-
lishers Institute, The Authors League of America, Inc., Composers & Lyricists Guild of
America, Inc., Music Publishers' Protective Association, Inc., Music Publishers Association of
the United States), reprinted in 5 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE H ISTORY  (George
S. Grossman, ed.) [hereinafter jowl' Mr:sio].
1" Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166,2175-76 (1989).
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agents agreed to allow four specific categories of commissioned
works to be deemed "works for hire," namely, a contribution to a
collective work, part of a motion picture, a translation, or a supple-
mentary work, but only if both parties agreed to such a designation
in writing.'"
In light of these compromises, the Copyright Office drafted a
new bill."'" Congress introduced the revised bill in 1965 accom-
panied by the Register of Copyrights' Supplementary Report, which
explained the provisions of the proposed copyright act in detail.'"
The 1965 bill and the Supplementary Report constitute the fifth
section of the record. The 1965 Bill enumerated the four chosen
categories of commissioned work that would be "works made for
hire" if the parties so agreed in writing)" Other special order or
commissioned works could not be classified as a "work for hire."'"
In 1966, the House Committee on the Judiciary endorsed the
"work for hire" compromise in the first legislative report on the
revision bill.' 38 Retaining the distinction between works created by
employees and commissioned works, the House Committee focused
instead on how to draw a statutory division between those commis-
sioned works that should be designated as "works made for hire"
under the provision and those that should not.'" The House Com-
mittee added four categories of commissioned works that would be
classified as "works made for hire" if the parties so agreed in writing:
compilations, instructional texts, tests, and atlases)" The 1976 Act
"3 1965 BILL, supra note 74, at 3-4. The 1965 Bill specified four categories of commis-
sioned works that could be "works made for hire:"
A 'work for hire' is: . . . (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use
as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture, as a
translation, or as supplementary work, if the parties expressly agree in writing
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
Id. Employers and employees could transfer statutory copyright rights that vested under the
"work fur hire" doctrine; parties, however, could not alter the status of a work made for hire
by operation of a contract. W. PATRY, supra note 4, at 121. The 1964 Revision Bill had allowed
parties to designate a work as work for hire by written agreement. Under the 1965 Bill,
however, only those commissioned works enumerated could be classified as works for hire if
the parties so agreed in writing. Id.
134 See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, Supra note 53, at xii - xiii.
135 Id. at v.
136 See 1965 BILL, supra note 74, at 3-4. See supra note 133 for the text of the provision.
187 See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 53, at 67-68.
'" Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166,2176 (1989).
mg Id.
140 Id.
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made only one modification to this list, otherwise mirroring the
definition of "works made for hire" contained in the 1965 Bill."'
During the eleven years following the 1965 Bill and before the
enactment of the 1976 Act, several witnesses appeared before Con-
gress to propose variations on the "work for hire" provision. 142
 The
Register of Copyrights consistently advised Congress to resist rec-
ommendations to modify terms of the negotiated compromise. 143
Congress deferred to the Register of Copyrights and enacted the
"works made for hire" provision essentially verbatim.'" Congress
noted in the legislative history that the "work for hire" provision
represented a compromise among industry representatives and de-
lineated the specific categories of specially commissioned works that
may be considered "works made for hire" under the 1976 Act. 1 A 5
In summary, Congress implemented a unique legislative pro-
cess for copyright law revision in the 1950s. Members of Congress
had little actual input in the debate of copyright issues. Instead,
acting on a mandate from Congress, special interest groups, funded
14 ' See id, at 2175-76. Congress added one additional category to section 101(2) of the
1976 Act, namely, answer materials for a test. See id, The 1976 Act had the same structure,
language and nearly the same terms as the 1965 bill.
l42 See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 62, at 264-71.
Li t REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 63, at 306-07.
' 44 See Litman, supra note 21, at 868; Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2175-76.
"5
 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 10, at 121. Congress stated:
The status of works prepared on special order or commission was a major issue
in the development of the definition of "works made for hire" in section 101,
which has undergone extensive revision during the legislative process. The basic
problem is how to draw a statutory line between those works written on special
order or commission that should be considered as "works made for hire," and
those that should not. The definition now provided by the bill represents a
compromise which, in effect, spells out those specific categories of commissioned
works that can be considered "works made for hire" under certain circum-
stances.
Id. Section 101(1) of the 1976 Act provides that works produced by an employee in the scope
of his or her employment are "works made for hire." 17 U.S.C. § 101(1). This section defines
a "work for hire" as: "(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment . . ." Id. Section 101(2) lists nine categories of commissioned works that are
considered "works for hire" if the parties so agree in writing. Id. § 101(2). Section 101(2)
defines a "work made for hire" as:
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text,
as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered
a work made for hire.
Id.
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by Congress and supervised by the Register of Copyrights, negoti-
ated to reach consensus on a variety of copyright issues. Dialogue
on the "work for hire" issue culminated in 1965 in a compromise
"works made for hire" provision. Congress endorsed the substance,
structure and language of this compromise in a 1965 congressional
bill. Although subsequent lobbying efforts attempted to alter the
compromise, Congress neither engaged in extensive debate follow-
ing the 1965 compromise nor altered the provision significantly.
Eleven years later, Congress codified this compromise almost ver-
batim in the "works made for hire" provision of the 1976 Copyright
Act.
III. CASES UNDER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
The definition of "works made for hire" in the 1976 Copyright
Act, enacted by Congress as section 101, mirrored the "work for
hire" provision of the 1965 Bil1.' 46 Section 101(1) mandated that
145 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2175-76 (1989).
Although the "works made for hire" provision of the 1976 Act was essentially drafted and
endorsed by Congress as the 1965 Bill, see id. at 2175, the provision was not effective until
1978 when the 1976 Act took effect. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). Thus, between 1965 and 1978,
courts resolved "work for hire" controversies under the 1909 Act. Prior to 1966, the courts
applied the "work for hire" doctrine of the 1909 Act only to traditional employees and
applied the common law presumption of implied assignment to independent creators, thereby
maintaining a clear distinction between the two. See Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2177; see also supra
notes 37-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of early courts' application of the "works
made for hire" doctrine under the 1909 Act. In 1966, however, contrary to the prior legal
scheme that had developed, courts began applying the "work for hire" doctrine to commis-
sioned works. Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 1987).
In the 1966 case of Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit complicated the previously clear distinction between
an employee and an independent artist. 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966). The Brattleboro court
explicitly merged the Yardley rule, that ownership of a commissioned work was presumed to
be assigned to the hiring party, into the "work For hire" doctrine. See id. at 567-68; see also
Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 326. The court held that, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, a merchant who had commissioned a local newspaper to create an advertisement
owned the copyright in the advertisement. Brattleboro. 369 F.2d at 568.
For the first time, the court applied the "works made for hire" doctrine to an independent
contractor. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 326. The Brattleboro court reasoned that the "work for
hire" doctrine should apply whenever a work is created at the direction and expense of the
hiring party, regardless of the nature of the employment relationship. Brattleboro, 369 F.2d
at 567. The court commented that the "work for hire" doctrine applied "whenever an
employee's work is produced at the instance and expense of his employer," and it could "see
no sound reason why these same principles [regarding works created by salaried employees)
are not applicable when the parties beat' the relationship of employer and independent
contractor." Id. at 567-68.
Six years later, in 1972, in Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., the United States Court of
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works created by an employee in the scope of his or her employment
would be "works made for hire." 47 Section 101(2) directed that
nine enumerated categories of commissioned works could be "works
made for hire" if the parties so agreed in writing.'" Despite the
clear statutory dichotomy between employee and independent cre-
ators, as set forth in the language' 49 and legislative history ' 5° of the
provision, courts developed inconsistent and contradictory tests to
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the broad language of its decision in Brattleboro,
noting that the nature or form of employment does not determine application of the statutory
"work for hire" doctrine. 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
The Picture. Music court held that the plaintiff, who had been assigned an interest in a song
by a freelance artist who had assisted in revising the song, had no copyright interest in the
song because the employers, not the freelance creator, acquired initial copyright ownership
in the song. Id. at 1217. The court recognized the freelance creator as an independent
contractor, but noted that the existence of an employer-independent contractor relationship
does not shield a creator from the application of the "work for hire" doctrine, See id. at
1216-17. The Picture Music court held that the freelance creator was an employee under the
1909 Act because the song was created at the direction and expense of her employers, who
maintained supervisory control over production of the song. Id. at 1216.
The decision of the Brattleboro court, therefore, marked the beginning of a shift in the
case law that led to the development of a new standard for the determination of a creator's
"works for hire" status under the 1909 Act. Ste Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at '326-27. Under this
new standard, represented by the Picture Music court's decision, a work was classified as a
"work for hire" if it was created at the initiative and expense of the hiring party and if that
party retained the right to supervise the production of the work. See Murray v. Gelderman,
566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978). The Murray court provided a succinct summary of the relevant
factors for determining an employer-employee relationship under the 1909 Act:
The crucial element in this [employment] determination appears to be whether
the work was created at the employer's insistence and expense, or, in other
words, whether the motivating factor in producing the work was the employer
who 'induced its creation. (citation omitted). Another factor is whether the
employer had the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the work
was being performed. (citation omitted). Actual exercise of that right is not
controlling, and copyright is vested in the employer who had no intention of
overseeing the detailed activity of any employee hired for the very purpose of
producing the material. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1310. Based on this standard, the buyer maintained a right to control the work simply
by paying for it. See Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 327. The Brattleboro court's expanded interpre-
tation of "employee" thereby developed into an almost irrebutable presumption that any
commissioning party became the statutory "author" under the "work for hire" doctrine by
virtue of payment, and therefore owned the copyright. Thus, the courts incorporated in-
dependent creators into the "work for hire" doctrine by expanding the definition of an
employer-employee relationship under the 1909 Act beyond the original, judicial definition
of an employee that contemplated regular, salaried employment.
1 " 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1988). See supra note 145 for text of provision.
"' Id. § 101(2). See supra note 145 for text of provision.
149 Reid, 109 S. C. at 2173.
"° M. at 2176.
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determine a creator's status under the "work for hire" provision of
the 1976 Copyright Act.' 5 '
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, which specifically endorsed an agency
law test,' 52
 federal courts had developed four tests for determining
"works made for hire" under the 1976 Act: the actual control test,'"
the right to control test,'" the agency law test,'" and the traditional
employee test.' 56
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
formulated the actual control test in 1984 in the case of Aldon
Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc. 157 The Aldon court held that a wholesale
designer and seller of statuettes owned the copyright in mini-stat-
uettes created by independent contractors.' 58 The court upheld a
jury instruction that an artist who is not a regular salaried employee
is nevertheless an "employee" under the "work for hire" provision
of the 1976 Act when operating under the supervision and direction
of the hiring party.' 59
The court applied post-1966 case law developed under the
1909 Act that grouped traditional, salaried employees and indepen-
151
 See id. at 2177. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text for a summary of the
tests.
152
 109 S. Ct. at 2168 (holding courts should first apply agency law principles to deter-
mine if a creator is an employee and then apply the "work For hire" doctrine).
' 53
 See Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410, 413
(4th Cir. 1987); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 553
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
154 See Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985); Town of
Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
155
 Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1987).
156
 Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989).
157
 738 F.2d 548, 553 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
In Id. at 549.
159 Id. at 552. In Aldon, the Aldon corporation commissioned statuettes by Japanese and
Taiwanese artists who were not regular, salaried Aldon employees. Arthur Ginsberg, a
principal of the Aldon corporation, conceived the idea of the statuettes and travelled to
Japan and Taiwan to supervise development of the idea and production of the statuettes.
Aldan advertised these mini-statuettes for sale in its 1980 and 1981 catalogues and at a 1981
gift trade show in Chicago. When Aldon became aware of the fact that the Spiegel Company
was advertising and selling brass unicorns through its catalogue that were identical to Aldon's
statuettes, Aldon sued Spiegel for copyright infringement. Spiegel 'argued that Aldon did
not own the copyright in the commissioned statuettes because they did not fall within one of
the nine categories of commissioned works enumerated in section 101(2) of the "work for
hire" definition. Id. at 549-52. The Aldon court rejected defendant Spiegel's argument that
independent creators were covered exclusively by section 101(2) of the "work for hire"
provision. Id. at 552.
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dent contractors together under "works made for hire." 16° These
cases held that a hiring party's right to supervise and control the
project was determinative of the creator's status as an employee
under the 1909 Act.' 6 ' The Aldan court reasoned that congressional
silence on this specific line of cases indicated Congress's intent to
incorporate into the 1976 Act the judicial concepts of "employee"
and "independent contractor" that had developed in the post-1966
cases.162 Narrowing the presumption somewhat, the court con-
cluded that an independent creator would be considered an "em-
ployee" under the "work for hire" doctrine if the hiring party paid
for and actually wielded control with respect to the creation of the
work.' 63
Just a year after Aldon, in the 1985 case of Peregrine v. Lauren
Corp., the United States District Court for Colorado adopted what
became known as the right to control test for determining copyright
ownership.'" The Peregrine court held that an advertising agency
owned the copyright in photographs taken by a commissioned free-
lance photographer because the agency retained the right to direct
the photographer's work. L 65
 The court recognized that the manner
of payment in this case suggested an independent contractor rela-
tionship. 166
 Nevertheless, the Peregrine court, like the Aldon court,
applied the post-1966 common-law rule that was based on the 1909
Act.'" and stated that a "work for hire" relationship existed if the
employer initiated the project and if the employer maintained the
right to direct and supervise the manner of production.' 68
la° See supra note 146 for a discussion of the "works made for hire" doctrine after 1966.
00 See id.
' 62 Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552.
'6' See id. at 552-53. The Aldon court concluded that because Arthur Ginsberg had
actively supervised production of the statuettes, they constituted "works made for hire" and
therefore Aldon was the statutory author. Id. at 553. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's holding that Spiegel had infringed on Aldon's copyright in the statuettes. Id.
at 549.
I" 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985).
155 Id. In Peregrine, an advertising agency commissioned Mr. Peregrine, a professional
photographer, to produce photographs for a brochure. After a dispute arose over payment,
Mr. Peregrine filed for and received copyright in the photographs. Subsequently, Mr. Pere-
grine sued the advertising agency for copyright infringement when the agency included the
photographs in the brochure. Id. at 828.
1 '1" Id. at 829.
157
 See supra note 146 for a discussion of the "works made for hire" doctrine after 1966.
I68 See id. at 829. The Peregrine court concluded that because the advertising agency
could have vetoed the photographer's ideas or work product at any time, a "work for hire"
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In the 1987 case of Easter Seal Society v. Playboy Enterprises, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted an
agency law test for the determination of employee under the "work
for hire" provision.' 69 In Easter Seal, the court held that a tape
created by a local television station for the Easter Seal Society was
not a "work for hire" under the 1976 Act.'" Recognizing a dichot-
omy between "employee" and independent contractor, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Restatement, of Agency
Law should determine a creator's status as an "employee" under
the 1976 Act.' 71
relationship existed and the advertising agency, not Mr. Peregrine, owned the copyright in
the photographs. Id.
Although similar, the actual control and the right to control tests differed in the kind of
control that created a "work for hire" employment relationship. Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2171 (1989). Under the right to control test, the
hiring party merely needed to retain the ability to supervise the method of production, even
if the employer never exerted that control. See id. Under the actual control test, however,
simply retaining the ability to supervise production was insufficient to create a "work for
hire" relationship; the employer must have actually exerted control over the project. See
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 553 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982
(1984).
1 " 815 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1987).
' 7° Id. In Easter Seal, the Society contracted with a local television station, WYES, to tape
a staged "mardi gras-style" parade and jazz jam session for airing on the National Easter Seal
Telethon. WYES's director made the artistic and technical decisions with regard to taping,
lighting, camera angles, color balance and sound recordings. The director produced a master
tape from the raw footage and aired the tape on the Telethon. The station kept the raw
footage on file and used portions of it occasionally in subsequent productions. The television
producer then sent portions of the tape to a Canadian producer in response to a request for
mardi gras footage. The tape became part of "Candy, the Stripper," an "adult film" produced
by Playboy Enterprises, Inc. The Society sued Playboy for copyright infringement claiming
that the Society owned the copyright because the tape constituted a "work for hire." Id. at
324-25.
171 Id. at 337. The Restatement of Agency defines a "servant" as follows: "(I) A servant is
a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the
physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right
to control." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958). Section 220(2) lists various
factors considered relevant in the determination of a "servant:"
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
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The Easter Seal court reasoned that the language of the "works
made for hire" provision reflects a clear dichotomy that treats in-
dependent contractors and employees differently.' 72 The Easter Seal
court adopted what it termed a bright line rule whereby only works
of employees or commissioned works that fell within one of the
categories of commissioned work enumerated in section 101(2)
could be classified as "works made for hire."'" The Easter Seal court
reasoned that mere supervision or the right to direct would not
bring a commissioned work under section 101(1) of the 1976 Act
because that section applied only to employees.' 74
In 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in the case of Dumas v. Gommerman set forth yet another
formulation of the "work for hire" doctrine, the regular employee
test.'" The Dumas court held that the non-salaried artist who had
prepared a series of lithographs was not an employee of the hiring
party within the meaning of the "works made for hire" provision
of the 1976 Act, regardless of the degree of control the hiring party
exercised over the artist. 176 The court therefore concluded that the
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the em-
ployer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master
and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
Id. § 220(2). Comment d to 202(1) indicates that "[Although control or right to control the
physical conduct of the person giving service is important and in many situations is deter-
minative, the control or right to control needed to establish the relationship of master and
servant may be very attenuated." Id. § 220(I), comment d.
112 Easter Seal, 815 17.2d at 335.
I" Id. at 337.
114 See id. at 335-36. Consequently, the Easter Seal court concluded that the tape was not
a "work for hire" because it neither fell within the enumerated categories of section 101(2)
nor was created by an employee. See id. at 337. The Easter Seal court noted that the term
"scope of employment" constituted a term of art under agency law. Id. at 335. Thus, the
court reasoned that "employees" under the 1976 Act are those persons who would be deemed
"servants" under agency law. Id, at 337. The Easter Seal court bolstered this reasoning with
the observation that connecting the "work for hire" provision to the well-developed agency
law doctrine would provide predictability fur the parties, an essential goal of the copyright
revision. ld. at 335. The court also noted that the agency law approach creates "moral
symmetry" because it would deem an employer a statutory author only in those circumstances
where the employer would also he held liable for an employee's negligent acts. Id. The Easter
Seal court held that because WYES was an independent contractor under agency law prin-
ciples, the Easter Seal Society was not the statutory "author" of the mardi gras tape. Id. at
337. Thus, the court concluded that because the Society was not the author of the tape,
Playboy's use of the film was not a copyright infringement.
05 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989).
174 Id. In Dumas, ITT Canon ("ITT"), through its advertising agency, commissioned
Patrick Nagel to create fimr works of art to be distributed as lithographs in an ITT pro-
motional campaign. The advertising agency provided Nagel with sketches and determined
some aspects of the paintings' design. The campaign was unsuccessful, leaving ITT with
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widow of a deceased artist, not the commissioning party, owned the
copyright in her late husband's lithographs.'"
The Dumas court examined the legislative history to determine
the application of the "work for hire" doctrine.'" The court noted
that the language of the congressional reports reflected Congress's
clear intent to embody the special interest groups' compromise in
the 1976 Act. 17" Thus, the Dumas court reasoned that one could
view the "work for hire" provision of the 1976 Act as a contract
among possible marketers of copyrighted materials which should
therefore be interpreted in light of what the negotiators intended
when they negotiated and agreed to terms.'"
The Dumas court concluded that Congress intended the 1976
"works made for hire" provision to replace the old common-law
tests based on the 1909 Act's' with a new, clear delineation between
employees and independent contractors.'" The court first noted
that section 101(2) provided statutory permission for certain kinds
of independent contractors to give authorship status to the hiring
party.'" The court reasoned that, because discussions between the
negotiators reflected an understanding that employee meant regu-
lar, salaried employees, not freelancers, courts should apply this
understanding of the term.' 84
The Dumas court reasoned that defining "employee" as a for-
mal, salaried employee would provide predictability for the artist
and the hiring party.'" Thus, the court concluded that only formal
salaried employees fall within section 101(1) of the "works made
for hire" provision and, therefore, freelance creators cannot be
many extra lithographs. Stefan Gommerman, an art gallery owner, purchased the remaining
sets from 1TT along with any existing copyrights in the lithographs. When Gommerman
created poster reproductions of one of the works, Jennifer Dumas, Nagel's widow, sued
Gommerman for copyright infringement. Id. at 1094-95.
177 Id. at 1105.
179 Id. at 1098-1101.
1 " See ed. at 1098-99.
180
 Id. at 1099.
181 See supra note 146 for a discussion of the "works made for hire" doctrine after 1966.
182 See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1102.
L" See id. at 1101.
194 Id.
L" See id. at 1105. The court held that several factors must be considered in order to
determine the creator's status in ambiguous cases. These factors include: where the artist
works and whose tools are used; whether the buyer's regular business involves the creation
of works of the type purchased; whether the artist works for several buyers at once; whether
the buyer maintains the discretion to hire assistants; the treatment of the employment
relationship for tax purposes; the method of payment; and whether the creator received all
benefits customarily extended to the buyer's regular employees. Id.
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"employees" under the 1976 Act. 186 The Dumas court determined
that Nagel, the deceased artist, was not a freelance creator within
one of the enumerated categories of section 101(2), nor was he an
"employee" of the hiring party under section 101(1). 187 The Dumas
court, therefore, affirmed the lower court ruling enjoining the de-
fendant from reproducing the lithographs created by Nagel.'"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case of Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid to resolve this
confusion surrounding the interpretation of the "work for hire"
provision of the 1976 Copyright Act. 189 In June 1989, the Reid Court
unanimously held that agency law should determine whether a
commissioned party qualifies as an "employee" under the "work for
hire" doctrine.' 90 In Reid, the Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence ("CCNV") hired Reid, an artist, to create a sculpture depicting
the plight of the homeless.' 91
 Reid used his own studio and supplies
to create the sculpture, but he received considerable input from
CCNV regarding the desired overall effect.' 92
 The parties did not
discuss the issue of copyright prior to or during the creation of the
186 Id. at 1105. The Dumas court rejected the control tests because these tests incorporated
concepts of "employee" developed under the 1909 Act and failed to acknowledge the change
implemented by the 1976 Act, Id. at 1102. The Dumas court reasoned that the control tests
misinterpreted congressional silence with regard to the 1909 Act case law because they
ignored the bargain achieved and endorsed by Congress prior to the development of this
case law. The Dumas court noted further that the actual control test would distort the balance
negotiators achieved by allowing independent contractors to be copyright "employees" in
circumstances not sanctioned by Congress or the negotiators. Id. at 1103. Additionally, the
Dumas court reasoned that the actual control test undercut certainty of ownership. This test
allowed a hiring party to obtain copyright after completion of a work by virtue of the
employer's actual involvement in the production of the work, even if the employer did not
initially bargain for copyright ownership.
The Dumas court also rejected the agency law test because agency law emphasizes the
extent of control that, by agreement, the employer may exercise over production of the
work. See id. at 1103-04. The court reasoned that some independent contractors who fall
outside of section 101(2)'s enumerated categories could be deemed "employees" under section
101(1) where the hiring party included provisions in the contract granting the hiring party
substantial rights of control. Id. at 1104. The Dumas-
 court noted that this potential conse-
quence of the agency law test violates the bright line that the drafters intended to create
between employees and independent contractors. Moreover, the court reasoned that because
the drafters of the Act rejected a "work for hire" doctrine incorporating agency law, it did




 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2170-71 (1989).
I" Id. at 2168.
Id. at 2169.
res Id. at 2171, 2179.
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sculpture, and the parties did not sign a written employment con-
tract. 193
After the sculpture's completion, both parties filed copyright
claims.'" Finding for CCNV, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the sculpture was a "work for
hire." 1 °5
 The district court reasoned that, because CCNV was the
motivating force behind the statue's production, Reid was an em-
ployee of CCNV within the meaning of section 101(1) of the "work
for hire" provision of the 1976 Act. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed the district court's decision, holding
that Reid was not an employee under agency law.' 96 Adopting a
literal interpretation of the 1976 Act, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that Reid was an independent contractor. Thus, the statue
was not a "work for hire" under section 101(1) of the 1976 Act.' 97
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's decision
in Reid. 198 Because the 1976 Act does not define "employee," the
Court assessed the language, structure, legislative history and pur-
pose of the "work for hire" provision to determine its application.m
The Reid Court noted that the language and structure of the pro-
vision clearly delineates between works prepared by an employee
and commissioned works, thereby creating a dichotomy between
employees and independent contractors. 200 Thus, the Court rea-
soned that a "work for hire" can arise by two mutually exclusive
routes, either from an employee or an independent contractor. 20 '
Reviewing the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the Reid Court
found further support for interpreting the "work for hire" provi-
sion as a dichotomy. 202 The Court acknowledged that the 1976 Act
represented a product of negotiation between industry represen-
tatives supervised by the Copyright Office and Congress. 203 The
Court also recognized that Congress, as well as the negotiating
parties, consistently viewed employees and independent creators as
193
	 at 2169.
19' Id. at 2170.
1 " Id.
1 % Id.
1" Id. A statue does not fall within one of the nine categories enumerated in § 101(2)
of the 1976 Act. See .supra note 145 for the text of section 101(2) of the Act.
'9" Id. at 2171.
199 Id. at 2172-78.
200 Id, at 2174.
201 Id .
202 Id. at 2174-77.
2" Id. at 2174.
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distinct entities. Additionally, the Court noted that the fact that
Congress and the parties involved in the negotiations intended the
term "employee" to refer to a "conventional employment relation-
ship," underscored the intended dichotomy between employee and
independent contractor. 204 The Reid Court observed that the nine
enumerated categories of commissioned works were chosen be-
cause, although they were not prepared by employees, they were
usually prepared at the direction of the publisher or producer. 2°'
Moreover, the Court noted that those publishers or producers bore
the economic risk of production. Thus, the Court reasoned that the
negotiating parties agreed that only the enumerated categories of
commissioned works should be treated as "works made for hire." 206
The Reid Court concluded that the legislative history highlights
two important points with regard to this dichotomy. 2"7 First, Con-
gress's enactment of the 1965 compromise, with minor modifica-
tions, indicated that Congress intended two mutually exclusive
means for achieving "work for hire" status."' Second, the legislative
history underscores the significance of the statutory language,
namely, only a work that falls within the enumerated categories of
commissioned works may be classified as a "work for hire."209
Examining the language of the "works made for hire" provi-
sion, the Reid Court stated that when Congress uses a term that has
achieved a settled common-law meaning, this use raises the infer-
ence that Congress intended to incorporate that meaning into the
statute, unless Congress explicitly indicated otherwise. 21° The Court
noted that in statutes other than the 1976 Copyright Act where
Congress has used the term "employee," the Court has inferred
congressional intent to describe a conventional "master-servant"
relationship under agency law. 211 The Reid Court reasoned, there-
fore, that because the text of the statute does not indicate otherwise,
Congress intended to incorporate the agency law definition of "em-
ployee" in the 1976 Act. 212
The Court noted that Congress's use of the term "scope of




"6 Id. at 2176-77.
"7 Id.
268
 Id. at 2176.
269 Id. at 2176-77.
20 Id. at 2172.
211 Id.
212 Id.
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Congress intended an "employee" under the 1976 Act to be under-
stood in light of the general common law of agency. 213
 In a footnote,
the Reid Court rejected the argument that "employee" refers to a
formal salaried employee. 214
 The Court recognized that the nego-
tiating parties and Congress at all times meant "employee" to refer
to a hired party in a traditional employment relationship. 216
 Never-
theless, although the Court acknowledged "some support" for that
definition of "employee," the Court noted that the 1976 Act does
not use the term "formal" or "salaried." 216 The Reid Court reasoned,
therefore, that the language of the 1976 Act does not support such
a restrictive interpretation of "employee." 21
The Court noted that the right to control and actual control
tests focus on a relationship between the hiring party and the work
produced. 218
 As such, these tests conflict with the language of the
provision, which focuses on the relationship between the parties.
The result, the Reid Court concluded, was that the control tests
ignore the dichotomy of the "work for hire" provision by trans-
forming commissioned works into "works made for hire." 219 The
Court reasoned that the right to control test makes little sense in
light of the nine enumerated categories because many works that
could qualify under section 101(2) would already be deemed "works
made for hire" under section 101(1), thereby making section 101(2)
superfluous. 220
 The Court reasoned further that the actual control
test creates an additional dichotomy between commissioned works
created under the actual control and supervision of an employer,
and commissioned works that are created independently. 22 ' This
dichotomy, the Court reasoned, was contrary to the structure of the
"work for hire" provision. 222
The Reid Court rejected the argument that Congress intended
to incorporate into the 1976 Act the line of cases decided under
2" Id.
214 Id. at 2174 n.8.
216 Id. at 2174.
216 Id. at 2174 n.8.
2L7 Id.
216 See id. at 2173-74.
219 Id. at 2174. The Court reiterated that preparation at the direction and at the risk of
the hiring party provides the common link among the nine commissioned works enumerated
in section 101(2). Id. at 2173. See supra note 145 for the text of section 101(2) of the 1976
Act.
22° Id. See supra note 145 for the text of the "work made for hire" provision of the 1976
Act.
221 Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2174.
222 Id. at 2174.
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the 1909 Act that espoused the right to control test. 223 The Court
noted that reliance on legislative silence is inappropriate because
the text and structure of the provision counsel otherwise. The Court
noted further that Congress drafted and adopted the "work for
hire" provision in 1965 before any federal court had ever applied
the "work for hire" doctrine to a commissioned work. Thus, the
Court reasoned that Congress could not have "jettisoned" a line of
cases not yet before the bar. 224
Lastly, the Reid Court concluded that the actual control test
impedes Congress's paramount goal in revising copyright law,
namely enhancing the predictability and certainty of copyright own-
ership. 223 The Court reasoned that because the actual control test
depends on whether a party has actually supervised the production
of a work, the parties cannot determine the "work for hire" status
of a work until late in the production process or even until after
the work is completed. 226 The Court further-reasoned that such a
condition impedes the ability of parties to plan and contract appro-
priately. The actual control test also allows a hiring party who has
not obtained a copyright assignment for a commissioned work fall-
ing outside of the enumerated categories in section 101(2), to obtain
author status unilaterally under the "work for hire" provision if the
hiring party actually supervises and directs the work. 227
Applying the general common law of agency, as set forth in
section 220 of the Restatement of Agency, 228 the Reid Court noted the
relevance of a hiring party's right to control the manner and means
of the creative process, but denied control as dispositive. 229 Al-
though CCNV directed Reid's work to ensure that the sculpture
met certain specifications, the Court reasoned that other factors
offset this supervision. 23° The Reid Court concluded, based on an
423 Id. at 2177. These cases specifically held that an employment relationship existed
under the "work for hire" doctrine whenever a party had the right to control or supervise
the artist's work. See supra note 146 for a discussion of the "works made for hire" doctrine
after 1966.
254 Id.
225 Id. at 2177.
226 Id, at 2178.
22 ' See id.
"' See supra note 171 for the text of section 220 of the Restatement of Agency.
449
	 109 S. Ct. at 2179.
252 See id. at 2178-79. Reid worked in his own studio; he supplied his own tools; CCNV
retained Reid for less than two months; Reid was compensated in a manner typical for an
independent contractor; Reid maintained complete discretion in hiring and paying assistants;
CCNNt's regular business did not include creating sculptures; and CCNV did not pay payroll
taxes, social security taxes or any employee benefits to Reid, Id.
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application of the general common law of agency, that Reid was an
independent contractor, not a CCN V employee, and therefore en-
titled to copyright ownership of the statue. 23 '
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE APPLICATION OF AGENCY
LAW TO "WORKS MADE FOR HIRE"
In the 1960s, congressional revision of copyright law involved
a unique legislative process in which Congress resisted traditional
lobbying and insisted that special interest groups negotiate to a
consensus. 232 Over a four year period, these congressionally sanc-
tioned special interest groups developed the structure and language
of the "works made for hire" provision of the 1976 Copyright Act. 233
Congress endorsed this compromise in 1966 and enacted it ten years
later with little congressional input and no significant change. 234 In
light of the paucity of congressional input, little evidence of Con-
gress's specific intent exists."5 Thus, congressional intent is best
understood in light of the discussions and comments of the congres-
sionally sanctioned negotiating parties who developed and essen-
tially drafted the "work for hire" provision. 236
Numerous discussions, written comments and reports indicate
that, without exception, the participants understood "employee"
under the "works made for hire" doctrine to mean a regular salaried
employee.237 Despite this persuasive evidence of congressional in-
tent, courts developed conflicting and contradictory tests to deter-
mine who is an "employee" for copyright purposes. 238 The Supreme
Court, in Community for Creative Non - Violence v. Reid, sought to re-
duce the confusion surrounding the interpretation of the "work for
hire" provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act. 239
"' Id. at 2179-80.
232 See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unique legislative
process preceding enactment of the 1976 Act.
233
	
supra notes 77-145 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pre-legislative
negotiations.
234 See Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2175-76.
235 See Litman, .supra note 21, at 868 n.122.
236 See id. at 864.
237 See supra notes 87-95, 108-18 and accompanying text for examples of participants'
understanding of the term "employee."
"" See supra notes 157-231 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflicting
"work For hire" case law.
239 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2170-71 (1989). See supra notes 190-231 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Reid decision.
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. The Reid Court, however, has only slightly remedied the prob-
lem. Its application of general common-law agency principles to
determine who is an "employee" under the "work for hire" provi-
sion of the 1976 Act threatens the negotiated balance and objectives
of the provision. The agency law test does not fully reflect the
compromise enacted by Congress in section 101 of the 1976 Act. 24 "
Moreover, the agency law test considers the issue of control in its
analysis, thereby perpetuating the problems of uncertainty of own-
ership that Congress sought to alleviate.
In Reid, the Court accurately analyzed the legislative history of
the 1976 Act, yet reached a result inconsistent with its own reason-
ing. The Court acknowledged that a unique process of negotiations
among industry representatives culminated in a compromise that
Congress endorsed and enacted as the "work for hire" provision of
the 1976 Act, 24 ' noting that Congress enacted the compromise al-
most verbatim. 242 Accordingly, the Reid Court looked to the inten-
tions of the negotiatitig parties who drafted the compromise to
ascertain their understanding of the term "employee" in order to
determine congressional intent. 243
The Court recognized that the negotiators considered the term
"employee" to mean a traditional employee, and that Congress
therefore intended "employee" in the 1976 Act to refer to a con-
ventional employment relationship.214 The Reid Court relied in part
on this congressional intent when it concluded that the enacted
provision represented a mutually exclusive dichotomy that treats
conventional employees and independent creators differently. 245 Al-
though the Reid Court properly determined that Congress intended
to create this statutory dichotomy, the Reid Court's definition of
"conventional employment" is inconsistent with congressional in-
tent. In its determination of the definition of "employee," the Reid
Court virtually ignored the clear meaning that the negotiators had
attributed to the term "employee."
Ample evidence indicates that Congress intended "employ-
ment" under the "work for hire" doctrine of the 1976 Act to mean
24" See supra notes 131-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of section 101 of the
1976 Act.
2
" 1 Reid, 109 S. Ct, at 2174-75.
942 Id. at 2175-76,
243 Id. at 2174.
244 id.
245 Id.
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formal, salaried employment. 246
 Throughout the pre-legislative dis-
cussions, all of the rigorous objections raised were based on the
notion that employment meant work performed by a regular, sal-
aried employee. 247 The negotiators' comments reflect a clear un-
derstanding that the Register's Report, the Preliminary Draft, the
1964 Revision Bill and the 1965 Bill were based on the distinction
between regular, salaried employees and independent creators. 248
For example, when participants in the extensive discussions on
the Register's Report and the Preliminary Draft referred to "works
made for hire," they assumed that employment meant regular,
salaried employment."' The negotiators disputed the different
treatment afforded to employees and independent creators; they
did not, however, debate the definition of "employee." The nego-
tiators understood and accepted that "employee" meant regular,
salaried employee. For example, negotiators framed their objections
to the Register's Report's recommendation to deny employers "au-
thor" status under the proposed act, using terms such as "weekly
payroll," which describe a conventional employment relationship. 25°
Similarly, negotiators objecting to the Preliminary Draft's differing
treatment of employees and independent creators used terms such
as "social security," "withholding," and "payroll," when referring to
employees.25 '
Moreover, negotiating parties disputed the Preliminary Draft's
exclusion of commissioned works from the definition of "works
made for hire" precisely because they viewed employees as tradi-
tional, salaried employees. Opponents of this omission were con-
cerned about the treatment of composite works, which rely exten-
sively on outside contractors. These representatives feared that it
would be necessary, but impossible, to put all the independent
creators on payroll in order to transform them into employees for
copyright purposes. The subsequent compromise reached by the
negotiating parties, which allowed nine categories of commissioned
works to be classified as "works made for hire," was structured
See supra notes 87-96,108-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the nego-
tiators' understanding of the term "employee."
2" See supra notes 82-130 and accompanying text for a discussion of the negotiations.
218 Id.
119 See supra notes 87-95,108-18 and accompanying text.
25" See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of participants' lan-
guage.
2" See supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text for examples of participants' lan-
guage.
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around this accepted distinction between a traditional employee and
an independent creator.
Congress adopted the negotiators' definition of "employee,"
namely, a regular, salaried employee. 252 Congress did not intend
the term "employee" to acquire an agency law meaning. Indeed,
during the negotiations over the Preliminary Draft, the Register of
Copyrights rejected the idea of using agency law to define "em-
ployee." 255 The Register of Copyrights dismissed the agency law
terms "servant" and "master" as "medieval" and the legal concept
of a "master-servant" relationship as an inappropriate means of
determining an "employee" under the "works made for hire" pro-
vision.254 Both the brief discussion of the recommendation to use a
"master-servant" definition under the "works made for hire" pro-
vision, and the Register of Copyrights' subsequent rejection of the
proposal, evidence the flaw in the Reid Court's adoption of agency
law to "works made for hire."255 Such a definition clearly contradicts
the understanding of the negotiators and thus misconstrues
congressional intent.
The Reid Court concluded that well-established agency law pro-
vides a uniform structure and a predictable basis for copyright
law.256 The Reid Court's agency law test, however, perpetuates the
problem of uncertainty of copyright ownership that Congress
sought to reduce in its copyright revision; the agency law test is a
mere reformation of the control tests that the Supreme Court re-
252 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of examples of
proposals to alter the "work for hire" compromise. Throughout the legislative process,
Congress consistently rejected recommendations to alter the terms of the "work for hire"
compromise. See id.
253 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text for discussion of the proposal to
apply agency law to "work for hire" doctrine. During discussions over the Preliminary Draft,
a representative from the American Bar Association proposed implementing a "works for
hire" provision that paralleled agency law. See id. This change would have expanded the class
of creators subject to the "work for hire" doctrine beyond formal, salaried employees because
the degree of control a "master" retains over his servant constitutes a relevant factor in
determining servant status. See supra note 171 for the text of section 220 of the Restatement
of Agency. Because a hiring party arguably retains control merely by paying an independent
creator, injecting agency law would have greatly expanded the reach of the "work for hire"
provisions to include almost all employer-independent creator relationships. Participants did
not pursue this idea in debate. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the sparse negotiations regarding the suggestion to incorporate agency law into the "works
for hire" provision of the 1976 Act.
254 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
"5 Id.
t" Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. 109 S. Ct. 2166,2173 (1989).
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jetted in Reid. 257 By defining "servant" in terms of control or the
right to control, section 220 of Restatement of Agency highlights the
importance of the control factor. 258 Section 220(2), which provides
a number of factors relevant to the determination of the status of
a worker, lists the degree of control retained by the employer as a
factor. 259 Moreover, comment d to section 220(1) explicitly states
the critical importance of control or right to contro1. 26° Thus, al-
though the Reid Court rejected the actual control and right to
control tests, the Court nevertheless reformulated these tests by
adopting the agency law approach. Consequently, despite the sta-
tutory dichotomy between employees and independant creators, the
Reid Court created a loophole through which independent contrac-
tors may be deemed "employees" for copyright purposes.
Moreover, agency law principles fail to provide courts with clear
guidelines because control remains undefined in agency law. Courts
may interpret control in various manners. For example, although
one court may emphasize the kind of control, another may look to
the actual control executed. Yet another court may look to the hiring
party's right to reject the end product. The division in the federal
courts over "actual" control and "right" to control highlights the
interpretive nightmare that this idea inspires.26 '
Thus, the Reid Court's agency law approach frustrates Con-
gress's intent in revising copyright law, namely, to provide predict-
ability. The agency law test is very malleable and allows courts too
much discretion. Although courts should weigh all relevant agency
law factors, courts now have the opportunity to treat the control
issue as dispositive. Viewed in this light, a court could classify a
commissioned work that does not fall within one of the nine enum-
erated categories as a "work for hire" under section 101(1) of the
provision.262 For example, courts could deem independent creators,
who are not within the nine enumerated categories, as employees
under section 101(1) where the hiring party contractually retains a
substantial right of control. Congress intended, and the Reid Court
acknowledged, that the nine enumerated categories constitute an
2" See id. at 2177.
459
	 supra note 171 for the text of section 220 of the Restatement of Agency.
259 See id.
26° See supra note 171 for the text of comment d of the Restatement of Agency.
26 ' See supra notes 157-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right to control
and actual control tests.
462 See supra note 145 for the text of section 101 of the 1976 Act.
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exclusive list.'" Expanding the reach of the statutory provisions
blurs the clear dichotomy between an employee and an independent
creator.
Furthermore, by excluding independent contractors whose
work does not fall within section 101(2) from "works made for hire"
status, Congress intended to protect such contractors from possibly
signing away their author status due to economic pressures. By
adopting the agency law approach, the Reid Court may be elimi-
nating this protection. 264 The agency law test will allow jockeying
by industries with significant bargaining power to the detriment of
creators. In addition to possibly affecting the initial determination
of ownership, application of the agency law test may produce sub-
sequent inequities. Because control constitutes a significant factor
under the agency law test, a party who obtains the initial copyright
in a work could subsequently be stripped of ownership years later
by a court considering, with hindsight, the control retained or ex-
ecuted by the hiring party. 265 Thus, the agency law test, incorpo-
rating notions of control, would reduce the exploitative value of
works made on commission. The possibility of a retroactive award
of copyright reduces the value of a commissioned work. By contrast,
absolute copyright ownership would allow creators to command
compensation commensurate with the rights alienated.
Congress should revise the "works made for hire" provision by
furnishing a definition of "employment" consistent with that envi-
sioned by the participants in the negotiations. The congressional
clarification of "employee" should mirror the negotiators' under-
standing of the term, namely, a regular, salaried employee. Fur-
thermore, a congressional definition should foster uniformity and
predictability in the "works made for hire" doctrine. A definition
that undercuts either objective would undermine the "work for
hire" doctrine. For example, a definition linked to state law, such
as one defining "employee" as a worker who receives all the benefits
mandated at state law, would complicate the application of the
doctrine. In contrast, a definition of "employee" based on federal
statutory mandates, such as federal income tax or social security tax
2" See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166,2175-76 (1989).
2`"4 See supra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of "works made for hire"
contracts.
265 See Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2177. The Reid Court noted that a test based on control will
allow hiring parties who have not obtained full assignment of copyright to obtain unilaterally
"work for hire" status rights years after the work has been completed simply by a showing
of control. Id.
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withholding provisions, would ensure uniform application of the
"works made for hire" provision and enhance predictablity.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's application of agency law principles in
Community for Creative Non-Violence u. Reid to define an "employee"
for copyright purposes threatens the negotiated balance and objec-
tives of the "works made for hire" provision of the 1976 Copyright
Act. The Reid Court's agency law test does not fully reflect the
"work for hire" compromise enacted by Congress in section 101 of
the 1976 Act. Furthermore, the agency law test considers the issue
of control in its analysis, thereby perpetuating the problems of
uncertainty of ownership that Congress sought to alleviate.
In light of the Supreme Court's flawed decision in Reid, Con-
gress should act to resolve the uncertainty and inequities surround-
ing the "works made for hire" doctrine. Congress should revise the
"works made for hire" provision of the 1976 Act by furnishing a
definition of employment. A congressional definition of "employee"
should be consistent with that envisioned by the congressionally
sanctioned special interest groups which debated, bargained and
ultimately developed the "works made for hire" provision of the
1976 Act—namely, a regular salaried employee.
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